(NOTE: I have received a request to make a PDF file of these four reunification articles and post it so that it would be easier to read or download. I don't have the tools for that on my computer. I will see what I can do over the weekend.)

In Part One, I gave a brief overview of the Sunshine policy and talked about Kim Dae-jung's time table for unification. In Part Two, I covered the unification experiences of Vietnam (Reunification by conquest) and Germany (Reunification by absorption). In Part Three, I reviewed the Hong Kong handover (The 'One country, many systems' approach) and the Yemeni unification and subsequent civil war (Yemen: Reunification by agreement).
In Part Four, I discuss what lessons can be drawn from the unification experiences of Vietnam, Germany, China and Yemen. I end Part Four and the article with a brief conclusion and bibliography (I know the bibliography is a bit skimpy, but I hammered this thing out in a hurry).
Here is a preview:
IV. Lessons for Korean unification
I deduced five lessons from the unification experiences of Vietnam, Germany, China and Yemen. While they may seem obvious, most of them have been ignored by the Kim and Roh (Moo-hyun) administrations. It was my work on this project a few years ago which put me on the path that eventually led me to the conclusion that the past two administrations have been anti-unification.
Those five lessons are:
A. Governments do not voluntarily give up sovereignty
This should really be a no-brainer. The acid test of any reunification plan is the moment when sovereignty passes from one or both the two Korean governments to a single body. In Yemen, everything was fine until the first post-unification elections in 1993. At that point, the Yemeni Socialist Party tried to break away from the union rather than give up its control of southern Yemen. That same lesson applies to Korea:

Under Kim's plan the crucial moment would be the change from confederation to federation. Kim's confederation would entail little loss of sovereignty aside from some trade and cultural agreements so it would have little more impact than that felt by members of the European Union. However, the plan calls for the Northern government to eventually give up it's position of authority while it still has the power to enforce it. There is little reason to believe that the Northern government would give up it's authority or the control of it's armed forces without heavier inducement than a tenuous hold on a regional government in a unified Korea.
B. Unification follows the destruction of one of the competing governments
This logically follows lesson A. However, attempting to directly destabilize the Pyongyang government could lead to Chinese intervention.
C. Windows of opportunity for unification may be narrow
It this section, I demonstrate how Germans and Yemenis "struck while the iron was hot." and quickly proceeded with unification when an opportunity presented itself:
Similarly, Korea must be prepared to quickly move towards unification whenever the opportunity arises. A scheme that inflexibly adheres to a long-term plan would be vulnerable to changing regional events.
D. Events and passions often move faster than governments
If the "wall" between the Koreas were opened even a little, it is likely that events would move faster than any government plans and the resulting rush towards unification would would destabilize one or both governments. This is the basic lesson from Germany's reunification.
E. Relationships should be created at multiple levels between the two governments and the fear of repercussions following unification should be reduced.
This is probably the one area of the Sunshine policy that I did not find fault in. There are amble reasons for North Korean government officials to fear unification:
During the 1950-53 war both sides committed terrible atrocities. Also, the trials of former presidents Chun Doo-hwan and Roh Tae-woo, despite promises not to do so, do little to reduce Northern fear of reprisals after unification(Drennan, 6).
Part of any unification policy should be a pledge not to seek large-scale retribution in a unified state. Multiple levels of contact between the Koreas should be sought to help ease the fear of unification by Northern officials.
V. Conclusion
(I'm getting sleepy, so I'll just quote the whole conclusion here.)
While President Kim's Sunshine policy has been successful in creating hope for peaceful coexistence between the two Koreas, the experiences of other nations gives little indication that it can succeed in the long term goal of peacefully and gradually reunifying the nation. In none of the instances did an established government voluntarily give up power and it would be unrealistic to expect the North Korean government to react differently.
Also, the balance required to chart a gradual path to unification would be almost impossible to maintain. The reliance on a relatively inflexible schedule would leave the plan vulnerable to internal forces which could hasten or dismantle the time frame. It would also depend on all relevant outside actors supporting Korean unification for several decades, a situation that is unlikely given the balance of forces and historical realities in the region.
Given these considerations, it is unlikely that the Sunshine policy will directly lead to it's stated objective of unification. That is not to say that president Kim's plan can't succeed; only that it is outside the realm of modern human experience.
However, Kim's policy could accomplish some goals towards unification. Any policy which eases tensions on the peninsula and brings the brings the two Koreas closer economically and politically, necessarily undermines the legitimacy of Korean division and by extension one of the two governments. Even small steps towards rapprochement could draw the historically, linguistically and ethnically homeogenous Korea people towards unification and sweep aside any government which opposes it.
While continuing to advocate gradual unification, the Kim administration should also prepare to move quickly when events warrant, including the taking of steps to support regime collapse in the North and to mitigate the consequences of that collapse. It could be another one of history's little ironies if a policy which specificly rejects the undermining of the Northern regime as a means of unification becomes the means of achieving that end.
If you have read the first three, don't stop now.
Recent Comments