(Central Asia)
(NOTE: I have received a request to make a PDF file of these four reunification articles and post it so that it would be easier to read or download. I don't have the tools for that on my computer. I will see what I can do over the weekend.)
In Part One, I gave a brief overview of the Sunshine policy and talked about Kim Dae-jung's time table for unification. In Part Two, I covered the unification experiences of Vietnam (Reunification by conquest) and Germany (Reunification by absorption). In Part Three, I reviewed the Hong Kong handover (The 'One country, many systems' approach) and the Yemeni unification and subsequent civil war (Yemen: Reunification by agreement).
In Part Four, I discuss what lessons can be drawn from the unification experiences of Vietnam, Germany, China and Yemen. I end Part Four and the article with a brief conclusion and bibliography (I know the bibliography is a bit skimpy, but I hammered this thing out in a hurry).
Here is a preview:
IV. Lessons for Korean unification
I deduced five lessons from the unification experiences of Vietnam, Germany, China and Yemen. While they may seem obvious, most of them have been ignored by the Kim and Roh (Moo-hyun) administrations. It was my work on this project a few years ago which put me on the path that eventually led me to the conclusion that the past two administrations have been anti-unification.
Those five lessons are:
A. Governments do not voluntarily give up sovereignty
This should really be a no-brainer. The acid test of any reunification plan is the moment when sovereignty passes from one or both the two Korean governments to a single body. In Yemen, everything was fine until the first post-unification elections in 1993. At that point, the Yemeni Socialist Party tried to break away from the union rather than give up its control of southern Yemen. That same lesson applies to Korea:
Under Kim's plan the crucial moment would be the change from confederation to federation. Kim's confederation would entail little loss of sovereignty aside from some trade and cultural agreements so it would have little more impact than that felt by members of the European Union. However, the plan calls for the Northern government to eventually give up it's position of authority while it still has the power to enforce it. There is little reason to believe that the Northern government would give up it's authority or the control of it's armed forces without heavier inducement than a tenuous hold on a regional government in a unified Korea.
B. Unification follows the destruction of one of the competing governments
This logically follows lesson A. However, attempting to directly destabilize the Pyongyang government could lead to Chinese intervention.
C. Windows of opportunity for unification may be narrow
It this section, I demonstrate how Germans and Yemenis "struck while the iron was hot." and quickly proceeded with unification when an opportunity presented itself:
Similarly, Korea must be prepared to quickly move towards unification whenever the opportunity arises. A scheme that inflexibly adheres to a long-term plan would be vulnerable to changing regional events.
D. Events and passions often move faster than governments
If the "wall" between the Koreas were opened even a little, it is likely that events would move faster than any government plans and the resulting rush towards unification would would destabilize one or both governments. This is the basic lesson from Germany's reunification.
E. Relationships should be created at multiple levels between the two governments and the fear of repercussions following unification should be reduced.
This is probably the one area of the Sunshine policy that I did not find fault in. There are amble reasons for North Korean government officials to fear unification:
During the 1950-53 war both sides committed terrible atrocities. Also, the trials of former presidents Chun Doo-hwan and Roh Tae-woo, despite promises not to do so, do little to reduce Northern fear of reprisals after unification(Drennan, 6).
Part of any unification policy should be a pledge not to seek large-scale retribution in a unified state. Multiple levels of contact between the Koreas should be sought to help ease the fear of unification by Northern officials.
V. Conclusion
(I'm getting sleepy, so I'll just quote the whole conclusion here.)
While President Kim's Sunshine policy has been successful in creating hope for peaceful coexistence between the two Koreas, the experiences of other nations gives little indication that it can succeed in the long term goal of peacefully and gradually reunifying the nation. In none of the instances did an established government voluntarily give up power and it would be unrealistic to expect the North Korean government to react differently.Also, the balance required to chart a gradual path to unification would be almost impossible to maintain. The reliance on a relatively inflexible schedule would leave the plan vulnerable to internal forces which could hasten or dismantle the time frame. It would also depend on all relevant outside actors supporting Korean unification for several decades, a situation that is unlikely given the balance of forces and historical realities in the region.
Given these considerations, it is unlikely that the Sunshine policy will directly lead to it's stated objective of unification. That is not to say that president Kim's plan can't succeed; only that it is outside the realm of modern human experience.
However, Kim's policy could accomplish some goals towards unification. Any policy which eases tensions on the peninsula and brings the brings the two Koreas closer economically and politically, necessarily undermines the legitimacy of Korean division and by extension one of the two governments. Even small steps towards rapprochement could draw the historically, linguistically and ethnically homeogenous Korea people towards unification and sweep aside any government which opposes it.
While continuing to advocate gradual unification, the Kim administration should also prepare to move quickly when events warrant, including the taking of steps to support regime collapse in the North and to mitigate the consequences of that collapse. It could be another one of history's little ironies if a policy which specificly rejects the undermining of the Northern regime as a means of unification becomes the means of achieving that end.
If you have read the first three, don't stop now.
Thanks for reading my whole article. I hope you find something useful.
IV. Lessons for Korean unification
Each of the modes of unification presented in the previous pages represent a unique set of political circumstances, both internal and external. However there are some lessons which may be drawn from them and applied to the situation in Korea.
As mentioned before, China's one-country, two systems approach is of limited use in the Korean situation. The system reflects the massive imbalance in power between China and the satellite systems in Hong Kong and Macau. In Korea's more balanced political environment, a system of divided authority would produce instability and result in redivision or civil war.
A. Governments do not voluntarily give up sovereignty
While this may seem self-evident, President Kim's plan relies in part on the belief that the Northern leadership would be willing to give up total control of a failing system in exchange for a part in a stronger system. However, in none of the cited examples of unification did the weaker side give up power voluntarily
Of the four processes of unification previously describe, only one was the result of an equal agreement between the two sides; Yemen's. That unification later degenerated into civil war once one of the parties realized that it would be relegated to a minor position in the unified government.
Under Kim's plan the crucial moment would be the change from confederation to federation. Kim's confederation would entail little loss of sovereignty aside from some trade and cultural agreements so it would have little more impact than that felt by members of the European Union. However, the plan calls for the Northern government to eventually give up it's position of authority while it still has the power to enforce it. There is little reason to believe that the Northern government would give up it's authority or the control of it's armed forces without heavier inducement than a tenuous hold on a regional government in a unified Korea.
B. Unification follows the destruction of one of the competing governments
In the three major examples, one of the governments was overthrown before unification could be completed. In Vietnam and Yemen, the armed forces of the of the other government destroyed their counterparts while the socialist government of East Germany was overthrown by internal disorder. The fall of the East Germany regime was hastened by actions of the West German government of Helmit Kohl, which in turn negotiated reunification with the East German care taker government that followed.
Geopolitical reality all but eliminates unification by overt force as a viable option. The South Korean government should be prepared to take advantage of any instability which might arise in the North but if that instability were found to be caused by direct Southern action, then China may intervene in support of the Pyongyang regime. However, the Seoul government should be prepared to take advantage of any instability in the North.
C. Windows of opportunity for unification may be narrow
The German and Yemenni experiences are most relevant to the current Korean situation. Both were able to negotiate an agreement on unification despite general opposition from many regional actors. Both overcame that regional opposition through the support of United States and by taking advantage a narrow diversion of opposing forces. Germany alleviated Russian fears and overcame French opposition in the aftermath of the Cold War while Yemen was able to temporarily secure support in it's civil war from the Persian Gulf states following the Gulf War.
Similarly, Korea must be prepared to quickly move towards unification whenever the opportunity arises. A scheme that inflexibly adheres to a long-term plan would be vulnerable to changing regional events. At any given time, one or more regional actors may oppose the creation of a unified Korea. A Korea divided against itself helped maintain a regional balance during and after the Cold War. Some of Korea's neighbors may fear that an united Korea would unsettle that balance and would work against it. This is particularly true of Japan, which sees a united Korea as a potential economic and political rival (Cumings, 490) and China, which benefits from simultaneously maintaining a strong trade relationship with the South and while having the North as a socialist buffer and potential ally in any future conflicts (Brzezinski, 165).
D. Events and passions often move faster than governments
In Germany, the people were acting on unification before any government agreement could be negotiated. Likewise, the move towards unification was hastened by the desires of the Yemeni people. It is difficult to imagine that the Korea people will sit back and wait for the final phase of unification once the its foundation has been placed.
The pressure to fully open the border and allow freedom of travel between the North and the South would be tremendous. It is highly doubtful that soldiers on either side would use force to maintain the borders in such a situation. Once that freedom of movement becomes established, the rational for maintaining two systems or even two autonomous regionals under one system would be rendered moot.
To that end, Kim's call for a single system in a second phase federal Korea is more realistic than either the reunification plan of the previous Southern government or the Confederation of Koryo as proposed by the North. However, the first two phases of Kim's plan would most likely be compressed by popular opinion once the first concrete steps towards unification are taken.
E. Relationships should be created at multiple levels between the two governments and the fear of repercussions following unification should be reduced.
One reason the Pyongyang government has been able to maintain power is the fear that many middle and upper level officials have about the consequences for them in the event of reunification under a hostile Southern regime (Eberstadt, 60). An important part of any unification effort would therefor be to establish relationships at multiple levels between the two governments and to reduce Northern fears of reprisals following unification.
In both Germany and Yemen, the governments of the dominant side made inroads into their counterparts' systems. West Germany's policy of Ost Politik did not cause moderation in the East German government but it did establish multiple levels of contact between the two governments which helped ease the transition to unification. The North Yemenni government was able to secure the support of factions within the South Yemenni YSP. On the other hand, the government's pressure and a campaign of assassination by a group backed by a third political faction against it's leaders contributed to the YSP leadership choosing to secede from the new union.
In both Germany and Yemen, there were no large scale trials of officials in the deposed governments. In Yemen only 16 leaders were tried while in Germany, there have only been a handful of trials for individual acts taken in East Germany.
The Kim government should maintain its contacts in the North and expand them to as many areas as possible. It should also try to reduce fear of what unification would mean for low level officials. Unfortunately, Korean history might make this difficult. During the 1950-53 war both sides committed terrible atrocities. Also, the trials of former presidents Chun Doo-hwan and Roh Tae-woo, despite promises not to do so, do little to reduce Northern fear of reprisals after unification(Drennan, 6). The Southern government will have to work hard to overcome that fear. Southern offers of amnesty or pardons would rightly be taken as efforts to undermine the Northern regime so the subject should just be touched indirectly through policy statements until an actual opportunity for unification arises.
V. Conclusion
While President Kim's Sunshine policy has been successful in creating hope for peaceful coexistence between the two Koreas, the experiences of other nations gives little indication that it can succeed in the long term goal of peacefully and gradually reunifying the nation. In none of the instances did an established government voluntarily give up power and it would be unrealistic to expect the North Korean government to react differently.
Also, the balance required to chart a gradual path to unification would be almost impossible to maintain. The reliance on a relatively inflexible schedule would leave the plan vulnerable to internal forces which could hasten or dismantle the time frame. It would also depend on all relevant outside actors supporting Korean unification for several decades, a situation that is unlikely given the balance of forces and historical realities in the region.
Given these considerations, it is unlikely that the Sunshine policy will directly lead to it's stated objective of unification. That is not to say that president Kim's plan can't succeed; only that it is outside the realm of modern human experience.
However, Kim's policy could accomplish some goals towards unification. Any policy which eases tensions on the peninsula and brings the brings the two Koreas closer economically and politically, necessarily undermines the legitimacy of Korean division and by extension one of the two governments. Even small steps towards rapprochement could draw the historically, linguistically and ethnically homeogenous Korea people towards unification and sweep aside any government which opposes it.
While continuing to advocate gradual unification, the Kim administration should also prepare to move quickly when events warrant, including the taking of steps to support regime collapse in the North and to mitigate the consequences of that collapse. It could be another one of history's little ironies if a policy which specificly rejects the undermining of the Northern regime as a means of unification becomes the means of achieving that end.
Bibliography
Choe, Sung, The inter-Korean summit and Sunshine Policy. Seoul. The Society for Northeast Asian Peace Studies, Millennium Books Press, 2000
Cumings, Bruce, Korea's place in the sun. New York. W. W. Norton & Company, 1997
Breen, Michael, The Koreans. London. Orion Business Books, 1998
Brezezinski, Zbigniew, The Grand Chessboard. New York. Basic Books, 1997
Downs, Chuck, Over the line. Washington. The American Enterprise Institute Press, 1999
Drennan, William M., "Prospects and implications of Korean unification," Northeast Asia Peace and Security Network. Online policy forum. The Nautilus Institute, 1997
Eberstadt, Nicholas, The end of North Korea. Washington. The American Enterprise Institute Press, 1999
Goulden, Joseph C., Korea: The untold story of the war. New York. McGraw-Hill, 1982
Hart-Landsberg, Martin, Korea: Division, reunification, and U.S. foreign policy. New York. Monthly Review Press, 1998
Hastings, Max, The Korean War. New York. Touchstone, 1987
Kim, Dae-jung, Address at the Free University of Berlin. March 9, 2000
Saif, Ahmed Abdel-Karim, The politics of survival and the structure of control in the unified Yemen 1990-97. MA dissertation, Department of Politics, University of Exeter. Exeter, United Kingdom. 1997
Schmidt, Helmut et. al., Report on the conclusions and recommendations by a high-level expert group on the lessons of the German unification process for Korea. Paris. February 17-18, 1993
Interesting, but I think your criticism mistakes the rhetoric for the fact. Although in principle the Sunshine policy is commitment to peaceful and negotiated union, should the North destabilize significantly the policy leaves the South with a strong force, suitable for police action should the opportunity arise.
In some respects the policy may be more directed at Northern citizens than their leadership, and it establishes the South's legitimacy as an intervening power, so long as it is not the instigator of any regime failure.
The previous balance, a life or death contest for legitimacy as whole Korea governments, did not seem to serve either country well.
With Juche looking untenable as a closed kingdom strategy, the collapse of the North seems to be less an if, than a when. Good relations between governments might indeed result in a negotiated settlement, as a Northern regime looks for an exit from an untenable position.
Unless a third power, like China, intervenes to exploit Northern instability, the opportunity seems unlikely to go away. The sunshine policy also makes outright absorbtion of the North by China less likely.
Perhaps the best thing about the policy though, is its effect on domestic politics. Hardline militarism has ceased to be a carte blanche for Southern governments, and quality of life in the South has improved.
Given that the Soviet collapse is credited as much to a living standards comparison as it is to cold war, and that it was driven at an elite rather than a popular level, Northern elites may by now be contemplating something similar.
Posted by: stuart munro | Wednesday, August 20, 2008 at 03:30 PM