Analysis of reunification policy in the Kim Dae-jung (and Roh Moo-hyun) administration: Part Three

For the half-dozen or so readers who have slogged through the first two parts; congratulations, you are half-way to the finish.

In Part One, I gave a brief overview of the Sunshine policy and talked about Kim Dae-jung's time table for unification. In Part Two, I covered the unification experiences of Vietnam (Reunification by conquest) and Germany (Reunification by absorption).

In Part Three, I go briefly go over the unification of China with Hong Kong using the system they hope to apply in an eventual unification with Taiwan. Then I spend a great deal more time on the unification experience of Yemen.

Here is a preview:

C. China: The 'One country, many systems' approach

I included a section on China and Hong Kong because of the 'One country, many systems' approach has similarities with some Korean plans for unification:

(pic from Jason Patton's web site)
That system does have some similarities to the "Confederated Republic of Koryeo" that had been proposed by Kim Il-sung. Under that system, Korea would operate under one nation, flag, and government while maintaining two different systems (Cumings, 489). President Kim also favors a confederated system, but only as a step towards a fully integrated system under a single system.

But I concluded that the Chinese experience didn't give any support to an idea of a "Confederated Republic of Koryeo:"

The idea of confederation leaves important questions: who will wield ultimate power in the central government and who will control the armed forces once the autonomous regions come under one system.

In the case of China, the answer to those questions was always known: Beijing. The inequality of One Country, Many Systems was demonstrated in June, 1999 when the Beijing government overruled Hong Kong's highest court on immigration from China, an area were Hong Kong supposedly exercised self-rule. The ruling destroyed the independence of Hong Kong's judiciary and removed any illusions about relationship between Hong Kong and the central government. In effect, Hong Kong did not reunify with China so much as change colonial masters.

(Side note, I just used a bunch of newspaper articles for background on my China section. Looking back, I should have quoted some of them.)

D. Yemen: Reunification by agreement

Of the unification events covered in the article, Yemen's is by far the most obscure. However it deserved mention because it was the only unification that was achieved (at least initially) by way of negotiations between equal governments.

However, the Yemeni unification has gotten onto the radar screen and, according to the Korea Times, the Korea Economic Research Institute (KERI) wants Korea to follow Yemen's methods. Here is a blurb from the K-Times article:

"We suggest Korea takes a closer look at how the once-divided Yemen with two conflicting political systems _ capitalism and communism _ moved toward a united nation through negotiations between the two governments," the KERI report said.

Obviously, someone at KERI did not do his homework. If he had, he would have known that Yemen's "negotiated unification" quickly led to civil war and North Yemen's conquest of South Yemen.

I used several good sources for the Yemen section but the single best source was a masters dissertation by Ahmed Abdel-Karim Saif. I was happy to find out that it is still on line (click here). It is a must-read for anyone who wants to study Yemeni unification.

The crucial time for negotiated unification is the moment when one of the governments must lose power. As one would expect, that is the moment when Yemen's peaceful unification efforts failed:

However, civil war broke out in 1994. The primary reason is that, while the Yemenis unified their territory, they failed to integrate their systems. Though the two sides shared thousand of years of history and a common culture, these were not guarantees that a workable unified government could be created (Saif, 5). Even a 50-50 power sharing arrangement between the Yemeni Socialist Party (YSP) of south Yemen and the General People's Congress (GPC) of north Yemen only served to postpone the eventual schism that took place after the first post-unification elections in 1993.

Anyone who talks about Yemen's unification in 1990 without talking about the 1994 civil war is trying to pull rose-colored wool over your eyes. (How's that for a mixed Metaphor?)

If that got you hungry for more, click on the 'continue reading' link and dig in.

Good job. Now stuff yourself with some of the Yangban's home cooking......

C. China: The 'One country, many systems' approach

In 1997, the lease by which the United Kingdom controled Hong Kong ran out. The Chinese, eager to maintain a prosperous Hong Kong as a conduit for foreign financing and to allay fears of unification in Taiwan, instituted the one country, many systems approach. Under that system, Hong Kong maintains it's capitalist system and a limited form of democracy and self-rule, while other functions such as foreign policy, defense and trade are performed by the central government in Beijing.

That system does have some similarities to the "Confederated Republic of Koryeo" that had been proposed by Kim Il-sung. Under that system, Korea would operate under one nation, flag, and government while maintaining two different systems (Cumings, 489). President Kim also favors a confederated system, but only as a step towards a fully integrated system under a single system. The idea of confederation leaves important questions: who will wield ultimate power in the central government and who will control the armed forces once the autonomous regions come under one system.

In the case of China, the answer to those questions was always known: Beijing. The inequality of One Country, Many Systems was demonstrated in June, 1999 when the Beijing government overruled Hong Kong's highest court on immigration from China, an area were Hong Kong supposedly exercised self-rule. The ruling destroyed the independence of Hong Kong's judiciary and removed any illusions about relationship between Hong Kong and the central government. In effect, Hong Kong did not reunify with China so much as change colonial masters. Ultimately, there is little choice that Hong Kong has other than to accept whatever orders the central government gives. It is on the basis of that inequality that the Beijing is able to maintain the system.

In Korea, were the two sides are much more equal politically and militarily, the ability a central government to exercise any kind influence on in a confederated system in Korea is doubtful. Both sides would jealously guard their own power bases, almost certainly including their respective militaries. Thus, a confederated Korea would been little more than a peninsular free trade zone. While this may be considered a stepping stone to ultimate unification, it could just as easily produce "stabilization without liberalization" in the north which would result in prolonging the division of Korea and its inherent dangers for another generation (Eberstaldt, 79).


D. Yemen: Reunification by agreement

When one hears about systems for unification, Yemen is rarely mentioned. This is surprising since, of all the national unifications that have been achieved in the past three decades, Yemen's most closely resembles the hope-for results of Kim Dae-jung's Sunshine policy, a mutually agreed upon union between equal partners. A closer examination of the events after Yemeni reunification could provide important insights for any Korea reunification negotiations as well as point out potential problems with Kim's approach.

Yemen is located on the south-west corner of the Arabian Peninsula and lies across the Gulf of Aden from the Horn of Africa. Because of its strategic location at a choke point of one of the world's major trade routes, it has been invaded by many nations in its history, including Rome, Persian and Ethiopia. The last of these conquests was begun by the British, who occupied the southern port city of Aden in 1839. The Ottoman Empire, in order to protect its interests in the area, responded by occupying northern Yemen in 1848. This division was to last for over 140 years.

The Turks were forced out of North Yemen in 1918 and an independent monarchy was established. However, the British stayed in South Yemen until 1967. At that point the British withdrew, and a marxist government was established. Tension quickly built between the two Yemens, which erupted into border wars in 1972 and 1979. Despite these conflicts the two sides prepared a draft constitution for a unified state, which had popular support in both nations. In doing so they opposition from some other Arab countries, especially Saudi Arabia. A timetable for unification was established in 1989 and reunification was achieved on May 22, 1990.

However, civil war broke out in 1994. The primary reason is that, while the Yemenis unified their territory, they failed to integrate their systems. Though the two sides shared thousand of years of history and a common culture, these were not guarantees that a workable unified government could be created (Saif, 5). Even a 50-50 power sharing arrangement between the Yemeni Socialist Party (YSP) of south Yemen and the General People's Congress (GPC) of north Yemen only served to postpone the eventual schism that took place after the first post-unification elections in 1993.

During the transition period from May, 1990 to May, 1994 there was a wholesale failure to integrate the two systems at the ground level: ....in practice, banking, currency and other key functions remained separate. The army commands of the two states were amalgamated, but the units remained separate. In similar fashion, such major national bodies (such) as trade unions and the militias were only united at the top, while retaining their previous composition in the middle and lower levels of ranking (Saif, 24).

This failure to integrate allowed the YSP regain control of some parts of the military and civil service after its eventual break with the government despite some deterioration of its authority withen those organizations.

The elections of April, 1993, which were to be a major step in implementing the new unity constitution, ended up causing the tensions between the two former ruling parties to push them towards civil war (Saif, 29). In those elections the GPC won 123 out of 301 seats, an islamic party, a coalition partner of the GPC, won 62 and the YSP gained only 56 seats. While the YSP faced relegation to minor opposition status in the national legislature, it still controled major factions in the governmental institutions. "Therefore, when they lost the elections, the YSP leaders had to rethink their attitude towards the key issues of unity" (Saif, 33).

The YSP leadership made a host of new demands of the central government. After those demands were not met, the YSP eventually declared South Yemen independent again. They believed that there would be some clashes at the old border followed by a cease fire which would led to a armistice that created a permanent border along the cease fire line, similar to what happened in Korea. However, withen two months, GPC forces captured the YSP capital of Aden. The reasons for the quick GPC victory were severalfold:

1-The YSP leadership failed to appreciate its international isolation. They had counted on the United States, among other nations, backing the redivision of the country. However the USA played a key role in blocking the recognition of the YSP government by several Arab states (Saif, 37).

2-The GPC penetrated many YSP organizations while keeping its own organizations largely out of YSP reach. Many members of the YSP were co-opted or assassinated prior to the 1994 split. Of course, this pressure probably increase the likelihood of secession by making the YSP leadership feel that they threatened with destruction even if they stay withen the unified system.

3-The GPC and YRR parties instituted an affect propaganda program against the YSP, accusing YSP leaders of being anit-islamic and anti-nationalistic.

Following the GPC victory, Yemeni president Ali Abdullah Salih moved quickly to consolidate his gains and relieve southern animosity. He pledged reconstruction in the South (where most of the fighting took place) and amnesty for those who participated in the war, expect for 16 YSP leaders. The merging of Southern institutions into those of the central government was stepped up, especially the military:

...the southern army (was) distributed into different branches of the military, so there should not be any aggregation of officers or soldiers belonging to the same tribe or province. Those holding high ranks in the southern army were retired or dismissed. Also, the security apparatus of the YSP was dissolved and was not incorporated into the state security system (saif, 45).

Thus striped of its military and security wings, the YSP was allowed to elect new leadership and rejoin the government. Despite this move by President Salih, there was still some animosity towards him withen the YSP. They boycotted the 1997 elections because of alleged irregularities. However, without a military apparatus at its command the YSP was no long a direct threat to the central government. President Salih even asked a southerner to form the new parliamentary government.

Despite Salih's overtures, regional and tribal differences remain a part of Yemeni political culture and will most likely continue to do so. A major challenge for the Yemeni leadership in the future will be to control those forces while promoting even economic growth throughout the country.