I have never pretended to be the most intellectual guy in the small world of Anglophone Korea bloggers (that distinction probably goes to the Marmot or the Infidel) but I can whip up a pretty mean analysis when I have to.
The other day, I came across an old paper I wrote a couple of years ago about Kim Dae-jung's Sunshine policy. You know the policy I'm talking about: It got Kim Dae-jung (DJ) a Nobel Peace Prize and allowed those minions of Set, Kim Jeong-il and his boys to get hundreds of millions of dollars in South Korean aid.
Despite protests to the contrary, Roh Moo-hyun's policies towards North Korea have not (yet) departed significantly from those of his predecessor (as stated in this Timeasia article):
Roh now takes office hooked to the five-year-old "Sunshine Policy" of predecessor Kim Dae Jung, which operated on the premise that engaging the North would make it a better world citizen—a notion that seems dangerously obsolete today.
So, my analysis of Kim Dae-jung's Sunshine policy might still have some relevance.
Let me give you a two words of warning:
1. This was a hastily put-together. It is generally well thought-out (IMHO), but there are gaps in some areas. However, I think it is solid enough (and I am lazy enough) that I will publish it without any changes.
2. It is long. It runs 22 pages (12 point font). I am going to break it into 4 parts and post one a day. I will offer a summery on the main page and the paper itself on the "Continue reading" page.
OK, here we go:
**************************************
I. Introduction
In the first five pages of the article, there is a brief introduction to the what will be covered in the next 21 pages followed by an overview of the Sunshine policy. Here is the first three paragraphs of the introduction:
Soon after his inauguration, South Korean President Kim Dae-jung made a sweeping change in South Korean policy towards North Korea. His engagement, or "Sunshine" policy has so far improved inter-Korean relations and raised the hope for many Koreas that the five-decades old national division might come to an end within a decade if not within a few years. However, Kim's vision takes a longer view and he sees the complete process of unification as taking several decades. The cornerstone of that policy is restraint, persistence and patience in the implementation of unification in a multi-decade process.The purpose of this report is to compare the expectations of the Kim policy with the experience of other nations that have undergone reunification in the past 25 years. A examination of those events could shed light on any limitations in Kim's policy and point to policy areas which may need to be further developed.
Section II presents an overview of the principles behind Kim's Sunshine policy and an outline of his proposed unification schedule. In section III the unification experiences of four nations; Vietnam, China, Germany and Yemen are examined. In Section IV the implications of those experiences for Korean unification are discussed. That is followed by a brief conclusion.
II. A brief overview of Kim Dae-jung's unification policy
Kim Dae-jung's reunification policy consisted of three basic principles:
First; zero tolerance of Northern Aggression.
This is one of the least well-known parts of the Sunshine policy. One quote from the article:
This increased defense capability is not designed to increase the South's ability retaliate after a Northern attack. Rather, it is designed to defeat any Northern provocation at any time or place.
Basically DJ wanted to divorce economic deals with the North from any provocations that Pyongyang might instigate. He could only do that and survive politically if Northern provocations were defeated without significant damage or loss of life in South Korea.
Second; A pledge not to absorb North Korea
DJ declared that he did not seek to absorb North Korea in the way that West Germany absorbed East Germany. This was a major departure from the policy of the Kim Young-sam administration, which sought to isolate and undermine Pyongyang. (Side Note: Roh seems to have gone to the other extreme and is doing all he can to prop the Pyongyang click up.)
Third; Promoting cooperation and reconciliation in Korea
DJ sought to use cooperation on economic and cultural ties with North Korea as a first step towards political cooperation and eventually unification:
This aspect of Kim's policy is similar to the "rapprochement through trade" policy that West Germany exercised in the generation before it peacefully absorbed East Germany.
B. Kim's timetable for unification
Here is part of that section:
Unification as envisioned by President Kim would be a three-phased, multi-decade process. It would entail an evolution from a confederation of "one nation, two states, two governments" to a single united state with either a centralized or federal form of government. The three phases of Kim's plan are confederation, federation and complete unification. Like his principles of unification, Kim sees these phases as parts of a whole: To bypass any phase would be to risk chaos and make peaceful unification all but impossible.
OK, if you are ready to read the original, click on the "continue reading" link below to read the first part of the original article.
Evaluating the prospects of Kim Dae-jung's Sunshine policy in light of the reunification experiences of four nations
by Andrew Jackson
I. Introduction
Soon after his inauguration, South Korean President Kim Dae-jung made a sweeping change in South Korean policy towards North Korea. His engagement, or "Sunshine" policy has so far improved inter-Korean relations and raised the hope for many Koreas that the five-decades old national division might come to an end within a decade if not within a few years. However, Kim's vision takes a longer view and he sees the complete process of unification as taking several decades. The cornerstone of that policy is restraint, persistence and patience in the implementation of unification in a multi-decade process.
The purpose of this report is to compare the expectations of the Kim policy with the experience of other nations that have undergone reunification in the past 25 years. A examination of those events could shed light on any limitations in Kim's policy and point to policy areas which may need to be further developed.
Section II presents an overview of the principles behind Kim's Sunshine policy and an outline of his proposed unification schedule. In section III the unification experiences of four nations; Vietnam, China, Germany and Yemen are examined. In Section IV the implications of those experiences for Korean unification are discussed. That is followed by a brief conclusion.
Please note that in writing the names of nations which have a compass point, I have followed standard practice and written North before South and East before West. There are no political implications in that practice. There are several Kim's mention in this paper. If "Kim" or "President Kim" is mentioned, it is the current South Korean President Kim Dae Jung.
II. A brief overview of Kim Dae-jung's unification policy
Kim Dae-jung has been developing his Sunshine Policy and unification formula for decades and has shown persistence in it's application. Given the results so far, an inter-Korean summit in Pyongyang, a prospective summit in Seoul and renewed family unions, the policy will most likely be maintained for the duration of the Kim administration and probably in the next administration as well. The following are an overview of the principles behind Kim's unification policy and an outline for unification under Kim's plan.
A. The three principles of Kim's Sunshine Policy
President Kim has been consistent on his three primary principles regarding North-South relations and eventual reunification. Those Principles are zero tolerance of Northern aggression, a pledge of no absorption of the North and a pledge of inter-Korean cooperation. Kim considers these to be integrated parts of a wholistic approach towards the long-term goal of unification. They are designed to force the Northern government towards a track that will lead to a peaceful unification over the course of several decades.
1. Zero tolerance of Northern aggression
This is probably the least appreciated aspect of Kim's unification policy, primarily because it does not fit with Kim's liberal image. This is especially true when more closely examined.
Kim's policy does not simply state that the South will defend itself against an attack. It goes beyond that to stress increasing South Korea's military capabilities and strengthening its alliances, especially with the United States and Japan. This increased defense capability is not designed to increase the South's ability retaliate after a Northern attack. Rather, it is designed to defeat any Northern provocation at any time or place. Kim's supporters point to the June 1999 naval incident, in which Southern ships successfully engaged Northern vessels as proof of Kim's seriousness with regard to his zero tolerance policy (Choi, 105).
At the same time, Kim has divorced political and economic policies with the North. Thus economic sanctions as a tool for responding to Northern provocations has been removed as a policy option. That places more emphasis on the South being able to defeat any provocation as it arises.
Kim's policy would have been difficult to implement previously, however the collapse of the Northern economy has severly diminished its ability to maintain its military parity with the south (see table 1). As of 1999, the North only spent half, in real terms, what the South spent on defense. This disparity will likely grow unless another financial crisis hits the South.
2. A pledge not to absorb North Korea
Following West Germany's absorbtion of its East counterpart, many Koreas thought that the same thing would eventually happen in Korea. Both those who are optimistic or pessimistic about the results of that possibility seem to regard it as inevitable. The German experience has been explored in minute detail to find applications for the Korean situation.
The policies of the previous government of Kim Young-sam seemed to be geared towards increasing Northern isolation and hastening
its collapse. Presumably, its absorbtion by the South would quickly follow. However, as of the time of this writing, the Pyongyang regime has been able to hold on to power.
The belief that economic hardships and even famine would cause the collapse of the Kim Jong-il government is at odds with historical experience in other socialist dictatorships. Famines in the Soviet Union (1933, 7 million dead) and China (1958-60, 30 million dead) did not result in regime collapse (Eberstadt, 62). Through control of information and the use of terror, totalitarian governments have been able to maintain internal control and while projecting strength internationally.
By pledging not to attempt to absorb the North, President Kim hopes to allay fears withen the Northern government about Southern intentions. The Kim administration's belief is that a North regime less worried about its survival would be more likely to engage in good-faith negotiations on a host of issues, including eventual unification (Choi, 107).
3. Promoting cooperation and reconciliation in Korea
Kim sees cooperation between the two Koreas as an indispensable first step towards unification. As part of his policy of reconciliation, Kim has separated economic and political considerations. The theory is that cooperation on economic and humanitarian issues, such as family reunions, will eventually produce enough mutual confidence as to allow for talks on long-term unification. To that end, the Kim government has continued the Kumgang Mountain tours and other areas of North-South cooperation in the face of occasional Northern provocations.
This aspect of Kim's policy is similar to the "rapprochement through trade" policy that West Germany exercised in the generation before it peacefully absorbed East Germany. Kim's supporters go to great lengths to show that his policy does not represent appeasement, although that charge has been numerously and vigorously laid against it. Kim regards reintegrating the economies of the North and South and restoring national homogeneity as being crucial steps to be taken before national unification (Choi, 106). There is also an argument that integrating the Korean economies will benefit the South by allowing Southern companies to retain their low-end production capabilities in areas (such as textiles) were Southern products are becoming less competitive due to rising wages (Eberstaldt, 73).
B. Kim's timetable for unification
Unification as envisioned by President Kim would be a three-phased, multi-decade process. It would entail an evolution from a confederation of "one nation, two states, two governments" to a single united state with either a centralized or federal form of government. The three phases of Kim's plan are confederation, federation and complete unification. Like his principles of unification, Kim sees these phases as parts of a whole: To bypass any phase would be to risk chaos and make peaceful unification all but impossible.
The first phase, confederation, entails creating a consultive body which would oversee the peaceful management of inter-Korean disputes and create conditions for successful integration of the two systems and . In the second phase a single government would be in charge of external and defense matters while internal matters would be administered by two autonomous governments acting under a single system. The final step would be complete unification, either under a centralized system or with several federal governments like those found in Germany or the United States.
The plan is similar to the three-phased plan of the Kim Young-sam administration but has been more systematically acted upon than it's counterpart. It also calls for a single system in the second phase of unification as opposed to the third phase in the previous government's plan (Choi, 303). That second phase is crucial since the North would have to adopt a democratic system as a precondition to entering a federation with the South. It is at that point that the Northern government would have to face losing power; both to the federal government and to whatever internal opposition may arise.
Despite Kim's rhetoric about the North and South uniting as equals, there is little doubt that the North would be coming into a union at best as a junior partner. The South has twice the population and several times the economic power. The democratic system that Kim envisions for a unified Korea is similar to the system the South operates under today. That lessens the possibility that the North would be willing to unite with the South under Kim's plan. However, more hope could be given for that plan if some precedent can be shown in the experience of other nations which have experienced reunification in the past several decades.
Comments